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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JA~IES

R. HENRY,

Appellant,

vs.
WASHIKI CLUB,

INCORPORA'~l_lED,'

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal frorn an Order of the District
Court of Weber County granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment. In the lVl'emorandum filed by
Defendant at the tin1e the ~fotion was heard, Defendant contended:
1. That under the facts and circumstances of the
case there was no duty on the part of the Defendant
to Plaintiff, and therefore Defendant was not guilty of
any negligence.
2. ~rhat ·Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and assurnption of risk as a rna tter of la-\v.
The facts of the case are as follows :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The Plaintiff is an industrial tool designer ( Jin1
Henry Deposition Page 11), who at the time of sustainip.g his injuries was employed in Ogden, Utah, for
Tool Research Company in this capacity (Ji1n Henry
Dep. 2 and 11). On April 24, 1959, the Plaintiff worked
his regular shift which ended at about 5:00 p. 1n. (Jim
Henry D·ep. P 18); he left \vork and arrived home at
about 6:00 P.M. (Jin1 Henry Dep. P 18). He and
his wife had previously made arrangen1ents to go to
dinner with two other men who were employed in a
similar capacity by his employer (Jim Henry D'ep. P 18).
Plaintiff, upon arriving home, changed clothes; thereafter he went to the State Liquor Store where he purchased a pint of whiskey and then returned hon1e (Jim
Henry Dep. P 18). About 7:30 P.M., ~Ir. Phipps,
(Jack Phipps Dep. P 3), a fellow e1nployee, arrived at
Plaintiff's residence; and Plaintiff, his wife, and 1\ir.
Phipps went to the Combo (Kitty Henry Dep. P 4),
where they met a Mr. Redman (Jack Phipps Dep. P 4),
also a fellow employee (Kitty Henry Dep P 4). While
at the Combo, Plaintiff had one 1nixed drink \vhich he
estimated contained about one ounce of \vhiskey (Kitty
Henry Dep. P 5, Jim Henry Dep. P 20-21, J aek Phipps
Dep. P 4). The four people then \Yent to ~Ir. Phipps'
apartment while 1\lr. Phipps changed clothes (l{itty
Henry Dep. P 21); the group then went to Graycliff
Lodge in Ogden Canyon, Utah, for dinner, arriving at
about 9:30 P.M. (Kitty H'enry Dep. P 7, Ji1n Henry
Dep. P 22). While they "\Vere \vaiting to be served,
Plaintiff had one mixed drink ( J aek Phipps Dep. P 7,
Kitty Henry Dep.P 7, Jin1 Henry Dep. P 23). At Greycliff Lodge, Plaintiff had a large steak dinner ( J aek
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I:)hipps Deposition P 6-8), after which the group proeeeded to the Cornbo, arriving there shortly before 12
midnight (Kitty Henry Dep. P 10 and 12, Jim Henry
Dep. P 24). Plaintiff and his friends were at the
Cornbo until 12:45 A.M. (Jin1 Henry Dep. P 27), and
during that tin1e he had two mixed drinks (Jim Henry
Dep. P 22) .. The group then walked from the Combo
to the Washiki Club located in the basement of th·e
Ogden Hotel (Kitty Henry Dep. P 14, Jim Henry Dep.
P 27). On arriving at the Washiki Club, each person
paid $1.00 for a so-called membership card, valid for
that particular evening only (Jim Henry Dep. P 28).
While at the Washiki Club, Plaintiff had one or possibly
two 1nixed drinks (Kitty Henry Dep. P 15 and 16, Jin1
Henry Dep. P 22). Between 1:30 to 1:45 A.M., Plaintiff and his wife made the suggestion that they go home,
and Plaintiff stated that he wanted to go to the restrooln before leaving (Kitty Henry Dep. P 16 and 17,
Jim Henry Dep. P 32 and 33). The description of the
physical layout of the W ashiki is necessary for an
understanding of the events that followed. The bar
in the club is located in the Northeast corner of a large
room containing tables and a small dance floor. Over
the bar the ceiling is lowered to give a canopy like efffect.
Directly to the North of the bar are located the Men's
and Ladies' rest rooms. There is a small neon sign
designating these rest rooms, but this sign is obscured
by the canopy over the bar from the view of persons
sitting at most of the tables in the larger room. It is
impossible to see the rest roorn signs from the tables
near the rear of the roon1 (McKinley Dep. P 6 and 1~).
Plaintiff and his 'vife were seated at table~ near the
3
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rear, or the south side of the roon1 (Jim Henry Dep.
P 29 and 30). On the south wall of the room is a neon
sign which says "DINING R001f OPEN". On the
night in question, this sign was not lighted (McKinley
D·ep. P 6). The lighting in the rnain room was ver'T
dim (Jim Henry Dep. P 33, Affidavit McKinlev P 7
and 8). Under neath the "DINING R001\I" sign were
two swinging doors ( lVfcKinle~v Dep. P 12) leading into
a room, now used as a store roorn, which roon1 had
previously been used as a kitchen (i\IcKinley Dep. P
6). This room was lighted by a single globe of about
25 watts intensity, (McKinley Dep. P 7 and 8) located
in the most easterly end of the room. In thi~ store
room was a stack of beer and soda water cases, a large
galvanized sink that ran part way across the roon1
which served as sort of a partition dividing the room
into two parts, a service entrance opening to the alley,
and a door leading to a sump purnp located do,,rn a
flight of concrete steps (NicKinley Dep. P 9).
Plaintiff had been to the W ashiki Club on one
previous occasion about six months previous to the
night in question (Kitty Henry Dep. P 14, Jim Henry
Dep. P 28). He testified that he had no recollection
of using the rest roon1 at that tinre (Jim Henry Dep.
p 32).
Plaintiff got up from his table and walked toward
the double doors at the back of the roorn, assurning
that these doors led to the restroorn ( Jin1 Henry Dep.
P 33). Plaintiff passed through the doors; he then
walked through a passage,vay in the store roorn and
made a tur11, and this was the last he rernernbered until
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he recalled crawling up a stairway (Jiin Henry Dep.
P 34). In the fall down the stairs, the Plaintiff received a severly corninuted fracture of the right wrist
(Kitty Henry Dep. P 22, Doctor's staternent,) together
with bruises and contusions. The fracture of the right
wrist has resulted in a per1nanent disability for Plaintiff. His work consisted of doing highly technical detailed engineering drawings related to specialized
n1achine tool design. As a result of the injuries he sustained in this fall, it is now impossible for him to draw
at all (.Jim Henry D·ep. P 48).
STATE.MENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANrr'S NEGLIGENCE
WAS ONE, OF FACT THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SUB~IITTED TO THE JURY, AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEF,ENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUl\fl\fARY JUDG~\IENT.
POINT II
THE TRIAl~ COURT ERRED IN FAII_jiNG TO SUB1\IIT THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO A
JURY, AND IN Irrs GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S
~lOTION FOR ~Ul\IlVIARY JUDG11ENT.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S STATUS AS ~ro WHETHER HE
WAS AN INVITEE·. OR LICENSEE WAS A QUESTION OF F ACrr FOR THE Jl1 RY, AND ~~HE TRIAL
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

COUR1_, ERRED IN GRANTING
MENT TO THE DEFENDANT.

SU~I~IARY

,JUDG-

POINT IV
THE TRIAL CO-URT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S l\IOTION FfJR SU:\I~\1..:\.RY JUDG~\IENT
IN THAT THE FACTS BEFORE TI-IE COURT PRESENTED ~rRIABLE ISSUES.

POINT I
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE
WAS ONE OF FACT THAT SHOULD HAVE BE,EK
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDA~T'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\IENT.
Upon a n1otion by the defendant for Sunm1ary Judgment, the evidence of the plaintiff should be taken as
true, and all reasonable inferences and presumptions
indulged which tend to support the position of the
plaintiff. The question n1ust be submitted to the jury
if the facts are such that reasonable 1ninds 1night reach
different conclusions thereon.
J>laintiff bases his clai1n of negligence on the part
of the defendant on the follo,ving: Defendant knev..
that prior to plaintiff's injury that other persons had
mistakenlly assu1ned that the doors leading to the kitchen and to the stairw·ay, \Vhl'l'e plaintiff \\·as injured,
6
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were doors leading to restrooms (McKinley Dep. P 7)
8). Despite the fact that defendant had actual knowledge of the likelihood that a patron would assurne that
the doors through which plaintiff passed led to restrooms, defendant took no action to lock the doors; to
bar the particular door leading to the cellar; or to post
a notice of warning of any kind on the doors until after
plaintiff's injury (McKinley Dep. P 7).
Is it not reasonable to assun1e that the ·exercise of
due care on the part of the defendant would require
the defendant, who had actual knowledge of the fact
that eustomers were prone to assume that the door in
qu·estion led to restrooms, to at least post a sign stating
''El\IPLO.YEES ONLY", "KEEP OUT", "NO ADMITrrANCE" '"DO NOT ENTER" or "PRIVATE" or any
'
'
'
.
words that would give a patron an indication that the
doors did not lead to a portion of the premises which
a parton might norrnally be expected to have access to~
The law is well settled that when an owner or
occupier of business premises has reason to apprehend
danger to a patron from a particular situation on the
premises, and that there is a possibility of injury to
the patron frorn such situation, then in such event, the
question as to "\vhether or not the occupier had violated
his duty toward the patron becomes a question of
fact for a jury to be deterrnined upon the evidence.
In the case of Campbell 'liS. Weathers, 111 P 2d 72,
77, 78, the Suprerne Court of Kansas quoted the follo\ving language fron1 Bass vs. Hunt, 100 P 2d 696, with
approval:
•'It is the duty of a restaurant keep·er to

7
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k~ep

in a reasonably safe condition the portions
of his establishment where his guests may be
expected to come and go, including a necessary
water closet and a passage thereto, and it cannot be said that as a matter of law that there
was no actionable negligence in his failure to
sufficiently light the passage,vay or to 'varn
a guest of an unlighted stairway covered by a
trap door which was not closed. * * * Appellant
had the right to assume if the hallway 'vas not
in a reasonably safe condition warnings signs
would be erected to appraise hin1 of lurking
danger, or that he would have been otherwise
notified concerning it."

Section 343-d, The Restatement of Torts
the duty owed a business visitor:

set~

fnrth

"WHAT BUSINESS VISITOR ENTITLED
TO EXPECT: A business visitor is entitled to
expect that the possessor will take reasonable
care to ascertain the actual condition of the
premises and, having discovered it, eith'er to make
it reasonably safe by repair or to give "Tarning
of the actual condition and the risk involved
therein."
Section 343-b of the Restatement of Torts deals
with the law in regard to a business visitor's use of the
wrong door while on the business premises.
"If the possessor has intentionally or negligently misled the visitor into reasonable belief
that a particular passageway or door is an appropriate means of reaching the business area
the visitor is entitled to the protection of a business visitor "Thile using this passage,yay or door.·~
It is certainly reasonable to assunie that rest roon1s
8
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for patron~ are part of the business area of a night club.
Plaintiff contends that an examination of all of the
farts and c-ircumstances of his injury clearly indicates
that he was ntisled in his search for a restroom by the
negligence of the defendant.
The question of ho\Y far the business area extends,
and the question of reasonable action on the part of a
business visitor were before the Utah Supreme Court
in the case of Martin vs. Jones, 253 P 2d, 359 (Utah
1953). In this case, the plaintiff entered Defendant's
drugstore to make som·e purchases. Except for the
bottled liquor counter, prescription counter, and soda
fountain, customers were allowed to pick up and handle
1nerchandise in the store without the assistance of th'e
clerks. Plaintiff's evidence showed that he purchased
razor blades and tablets for which he had paid; he
asked for an automatic pencil and was told by the clerk
that they were displayed on a shelf by the liquor counter.
Plaintiff then proceeded to the rear of the store. He
stated that he observed no signs barring his admittance, and that he saw nothing unusual about the floor
by the counter, alhough the floor was shadowy. As
he reached up on tip-toe to remove a display card from
the shelf about seven feet above the floor, he took a
step sideways on what appeared to hi1n to be the floor
and suddenly fell down a dumb-waiter shaft into the
basen1ent eight or ten feet below. Defendant's en1ployees testified that when the clerks waited on plaintiff,
he said nothing about \vanting a pencil, and the clerks
,vent on serving other custo1ners. One clerk testified
that when she next observed appellant, he was standing
behind the liquor counter vvith a display card of pencils
9
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in his hand. She went over to him and asked if she
could serve him. He removed a pencil from the card
and turned to place the card on the shelf ; and in doing
so f'ell down the shaft. The clerk said she did not tell
him that he was not allowed behind the liquor counter.
She also said that the lighting in the store made the
open shaft visible, and she thus assu1ned plaintiff could
see it, so she did not warn hi1n of the danger. D·efendant was able to prove that at the entrance to the rear
of the counter was posted the sign" No Admittance Employees Only". The case 'vent to a jury, and the
jury returned a verdict No cause of Action. Plaintiff
appealed and the Court reversed on the ground of
error in the instructions. The Supreme Court in reversing the judgment and ordering a new trial held
at page 362:
"A jury could find that ~Irs. Cannon (defendant's clerk) had reason to believe that the
Appellant did not have notice of and 'vould not
discover a hazard on the floor behind the counter.
Assuming that she thought that he read the ·xo
Admittance' sign as h'e made his 'vay behind the
counter, she could be charged with the realization that he had no reason to believe that his
admittance was barred because of hazards lurking, but because the n1anagen1ent did not \Yant
liquor bottles tampered 'Yith, being under bond
to the State for their strict account. That there
should be an open hole behind a counter in a
modern store where clerks 'vall\: seein8 certainlY..,
extraordinary, raising a jury question as to
whether the respondent's e1nployees had reason
to believe that a custo1ner \Vho \vas unfa1niliar
\vith that part of the store and \vho hnd his ut-

10
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tention focuS'ed on a display card seven feet
above the floor would not see an open hole -in
the floor."
It is respectfully submitted that there was a1nple
evidence on the question of negligence on the part of
the defendant to require the court to submit that issue
to a jury for determination, and that the trial court
erred in granting defendant's Motion for Surnmary
Judgntent.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SU:BMIT THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO
.l~ JURY, AND IN ITS GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S l\IOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\1ENT.
Defendant has contended that Plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence as a n1atter of law. This
contention is apparently based upon the claim that there
was nothing which particularly indicated to Plaintiff
that the doors through which he passed led to restrooms.
This contention of the Defendant ignores the testimony
of McKinley, the operator of Defendant's premises
(McKinley Dep. P. 8), as well as the testimony of two
of Defendant's employees, Nixon, the head awiter, and
Lernmon, a vvaiter (Nixon Dep. P. 10, 11; Lemn1on Dep.
P. 4, 5 ), all to the effect that other persons have made
the san1e assurnption that plaintiff 1nade regarding
vvhere the doors in question led. The cited portions of
the depositions indicate clearly that despite defendant'~
knowledge of the erroneous assu1nptions frequently rnade
by its patrons concerning the location of the re~troo1ns,
that Defendant still did nothing to provide any form
11
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of warning to its patrons. The additional fact that
Defendant's rnanager knew that from the place where
Plaintiff was sitting it would be impossible for him
to see the sign which indicated the location of the restrooms must also be considered (1IcKinley Dep. P 6).
The reasonableness of plaintiff's action in seeking a
restroom should also be regarded in the light of the
actions of Carl Gillis as sho\vn by his Affidavit. Gillis
sought a r'estroom in the identical manner in which
Plaintff sought one, at a ti1ne shortly after Plaintiff
passed through the doors in question.
Plaintiff's position in regard to contributory negligence is well stated in the case of Martin vs. Fox West
Coast Theater Corportion, 108 P 2d 29, which states
as follows at page 32:
"Where different conclusions 1nay be reasonably drawn by different minds from the same
evidence the decision must be left to the triers
of the fact, and in the instant case it is clear to us
that whether tire situation in which he (plaintiff)
found himself was such as to impress upon the
mind of the (plaintiff) the danger incident to
going around the front end of a parked autonlobile was for the jury to decide as an issue of
fact. The question of contributory negligence
is always one of fact for the jury to decide under
proper instructions, except in those cases in
which, judged in the light of common kno,vledge
and experienc'e, there is a standard of prudence
to which all persons silnilarly situated n1ust conform. It is only in these last narned casc~s that
failure to adhere to that con1n1on ~tandard
is a~ 1natter of la\v of contributorY. neo·li
b
t:-'t:lnce. ,,
0

12
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The Utah case of lYioore vs. Miles, 158 P 2d 676
(Utah), deals with a fact situation not dissimilar to the
one now before the Court. In the Miles case the Plaintiff was a guest at Defendant's hotel, and she left her
roon1 to go to h·er car in the parking lot maintained by
the hotel to the west of the building. Extending east
and west across the building on the same floor as Plaintiff's room was a hallway, the east end of which turned
down into the lobby by an ''L" stairway. At the end
of the hallway was a short flight of steps I·eading directly to the door leading to the parking lot. Plaintiff
fell down these steps and sustained a fractured arm.
The Plaintiff recovered judgment. Defendant appealed
on the contention:
a. That there was not sufficient evidence to take
the case to the jury.
b. Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
as a 1natter of law.
As to the matter of evidence sufficient to take the
case to the jury, the Court held that under the laws
of the State of Utah, the defendant had a duty of keeping the hallways of the hotel properly lighted, and that
since there was evidence of failure to keep them prop·erly
lighted, the question of the Defendant's negligence 'vas
one for th·e jury to deterrnine.
On point b., the defendant contended that the testirnony showed that the west end of the hall 'vas so dark
that plaintiff could not Hee the stairs; that plaintiff
was walking slowly feeling ahead with her foot; that
sh·e lost her balance and fell down the short flight of
steps to the door,vay; and that this action on her part

13
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1nade her guilty of of contributory negligence· as a
matter of law. Defendant further argued· that si1i"ce
Plaintiff had a choice of going do,vn the .stair,vay to
the lobby which was a well lighted passageway, or going
down the west stairway which was dark, that she was
negligent as a matter of la\v because she chose the
route which proved to be unsafe. In ans,vering the
question of contributory negligence the court said at
page 677:
"The next question for consideration is
whether Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in proceeding do,vn
the darkened hallway knowing that the stnir,vay
was at the end thereof. In this jur·isdiction 'U:c
are committed to the doctrine that the quest,ion
of ·contributory negligence is one for the jury,
different conclusions may be reasonably dra·Lcn
by different minds from the same ecidence."
(emphasis ours)
The court further said at page 678:
"In view of the foregoing authorities and
the long established rule in this jurisdiction, that
contributory negligence is a question for a jury,
we hold that the issue of contributory negligence
was properly sub1nitted to the jury by the trial
court."
The case of Flanigan vs. Madison Pla.z:a Grill, Inc.
30 Atlantic 2d 38, dealt with a 1nistake of the Plaintiff in
regard to the door which led to the l'eBtl'OOlll. r_rhe facts
in this case are as follo\vs : The Plaintiff \vho \vas
previously unfarniliar 'vith defendanfs restaurant entered between 9 and 10 P.l\L; she left her con1panions
in a booth and proceeded down a din1ly lighted eorri4or
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which a sign indicated as the way to the restroo1n and
telephones. She noted a sign over a door indicating
that it was the 1nen's room; adjacent thereto was another
door which was slightly ajar through which a light
showed, and whieh was marked "Private"; but plaintiff
testified she did not notice the sign marked "Private".
Plaintiff stepped through this door and fell down the
cellar steps, and in the fall she was injured.
The Court held that the question as to whether she
The court
used reasonable care was one of fact.
stated at page 39 :
"The location and construction of these
rooms off the corridor, which were such that it
was not an unreasonable assumption on the part
of the plaintiff, entering the premises for the
first time that the door which she op·ened was intended for ladies in view of the circu1nstanee~
that she did not observe the sign 'Private' on this
door when she opened it".
~rhe

Court further held that if she mistakenly
thought she was entering the ladies' room, it could not
be ass tuned that she expected to find a staircase there.
"She had no duty to 1nake constant observation or to proce·ed with Inore than reasonable
care, and that whether or not she proceeded ,,·ith
reasonable care vvas a question of fact for the
Jury."
A Motion for a directed verdict vvas properly refused because the court held the evidenee showed that
Plaintiff had not exceeded her invitation, and that she
\Vas not guilty of contributory negligence as a n1atter
of la,Y. The court further held that contributory negli-
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gence does not autoinatically follow because the accident
might have been avoided. The reasonableness of her
action under the circumstances was held to be a question
of fact for the jury.
In the case of Hall et ux. vs. Boise Payette Lumber,
125 P 2d 311, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
stated as follows on a matter closely allied to the n1atters
before the court in the instant case, quoting at page 313:
"Whet:lrer maintaining an unlocked door
swinging in and over a precipitous stairway down
into a dark basement; whether maintaining such
a door without warning sign thereon, or any
hint that the door led into a basement and not
into another room; whether maintaining such a
door opening into a dark basement abruptly descending from the threshold to the first step;
whether the absence of a railing on the east side
of the stairway, leaving that side without anything to catch hold of, with a eement well on the
west side; and, whether the failure of the Inanager to warn Mrs. Hall consituted negligence on
the part of appellant, and whether the acts and
conduct of Mrs. Hall constituted contributory
negligence, were questions for the fury. Stearns
v. Graves, 62 Idaho ________ , 111 P 2d 822, 884;
Byington v. Horton, 61 Idaho 389, 401, 102 P 2d
652, 657; Asumendi v. Ferguson, 57 Idaho 450,
465, 65 P 2d 713." (Emphasis ours)
"Furthermore, conceding, but not deciding,
that one person might reasonably dra"- the conclusion that the n1aintenance of the door in question in the circu1nstanC'es hereinabove 8tated did
not constitute actionable negligence, another
n1ight, with equal reason to say the least, conclude it constituted actionable negligence. . rrhi8
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court held in Fleenor r. Oregon Short Line R.
Co., 16 Idaho 781, 102 P 897;
•• 'Where the evidence on 1naterial facts is
conflicting, or where on undisputed facts reasonable and fair-minded men may differ as to the
inferences and conclusions to be drawn, or where
different conclusions might reasonably be reached
by different minds, the question of negligence is
one of fact to be submitted to the jury'".

Denton v. City of Twin Falls, 34 Idaho 35,
28 P 2d 202; Call vs. City of Burley, 57 Idaho
69, 62 P 2d 101; Bennett v. Deaton, 57 Idaho 752,
767, 68 p 2d 895."
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Stickle vs.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 251 P 2d 867 at Page 870,
122 U. 477, discussed the question of a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law as follows at
Pages 870, 871 :
"Contributory negligence is an affirmative
defense and the burden rests upon the defendant
to prove it by preponderance of the evidence.
* * * If evidence were such that reasonable 1nen
may fairly say that they are not convinced fro1n a
preponderance of the evidence that he was guilty
of negligence, the court could not rule that he
was negligent as a matter of la\v and take the
case from the jury. * * *
"In our democratic ~y~ten1, the people are
the repository of power whence the la\\T is derived; from its initiation and creation to its final
application and enforce1nent, the la\v is the expression of their will. The functioning of a eros~section of the citizenry as a jury is thP n1ethod
by which the p·eople express this \vjl} in the ap17
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plication of law to controversies which arise
under it. Both our constitution and _statutorY
provisions assure trial by jury to citizens of thi~
state * * *
"A very fine statement of the proper attitude
toward this right was expressed for this court
by the late 1\ir. Justice Frick in N eu·ton ~·s. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. where, in referring
to the question of submitting plaintiff's contributory negligence to a jury, he made these statements : 'The Court can pass upon the question
of negligence only in clear cases. * * * unless
the question of negligence is free from doubt, the
court cannot pass upon it as a question of laV~r
* * * if.* * * the court is in doubt wh'ether reasonable men, * * * might arrive at different conclusions, then this very doubt detern1ines the
question to be one of fact for the jury and not
one for law for the Court."
Plaintiff submits that it is certainly reasonable to
assume that fair minded men may arrive at different
conclusions from the evidence of plaintiff's actions on
the night of his injury, and that, therefore, the 1natter
should have be'en submitted to the jury, and the trial
court erred in granting the n1otion for Summary J udgment.

POINT III
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER PLAINTIFF
WAS AN INVITEE OR LICENSEE UNDER THESE
FACTS PRESE,NTED A QUESTION OF FACT FOR
THE JURY, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IX
GRANTING SUl\IlVfARY JUDGl\1:ENT TO THE DEFENDAN'J~.
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Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff can1e
upon its prernises as a business visitor, and that he was
thereb~r entitled to he regarded as an invitee. Defendant contended to the trial court that Plaintiff, in leaving
the area of the premises 'vhere the tables and chairs
were located and in passing through the un1narked
door~ in search of a restroom, lost his status as an invitee, and he thereby became a licensee. Plaintiff would
lose his status as an invitee only if his action in seeking
a restroom in the manner he did was unreasonable under
all of the circumstances. In considering what was reasonable under the circumstances, one must give regard
to the fact that the sign indicating the location of the
restroorns was not visible from the area where Plaintiff
\vas sitting. (McKinley dep P. 6); that Plaintiff had
been in Defendant's establish1nent only once before,
and that he did not recall using the restroom at that
time; and that there was no sign indicating that the
doors through which Plaintiff passed led to an area
that was restricted in any \vay (~fcl(inley Dep P 6 & 7).
In fact, the unlighted neon sign above the door stated
HDining Roo1n OPEN".
In the case of H ectus 'VS. Chicago Transit Company,
Illinois, ( 1954) 122 NE 2d 587, the Court in discussing
the facts that bore on Plaintiff's status as an invite'e or
a trespasser said at pages 589, and 590:
"With respect to Defendant's contention that
Plaintiff 'vas a tr·esspasser, it argues that Plaintiff was roaming about on a part of Defendant's
pren1ises where he had no right to be.. . 1 hi~
argument is based on the theory that the 1nen'~
washroo1n in the Loop \Vas intended for the ex1
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elusive us·e of defendant's employees. The evidence on this point is conflicting.
There \vas
evidence, however, tending to prove that the
washroom was used by the public. A police officer testified that he used the men's \vashrooin
on many occasions at night for a period of t\vo
years prior to the accident; and that he sa\v persons not employed by the Defendant use it, and
that he never found the door locked. l\Iotornu1n
Corcoran admitted that he 'gave lot of guy,~' other
than employees of the defendant 'favors by opening the door for them'. Another .:\Iotorman stated
that • the washroom was us·ed by streetcar passengers and other people.
Whether plaintiff was an inL·itee }J'resented
a question of fact for the jury to deteTnzine. \\T e
think the 'evidence is ample to warrant the finding that the Plaintiff was an invitee.
See
Eliguth vs. Blackstone Hotel, Inc. 408 Ill. 343,
97 NE 2d 290; Larson vs. Illinois Central RaiZ.icay
Co., 2 Ill. App 2d, 102, 118 NE 2d 886." (emphasis
ours).

Whether or not an invitee exceeds the lilnits of his
invitation is dep·endant upon the facts of each case. If
the use of the pre1nises by the injured person is \vithin
the bounds of the use with which the owner may reasonably contemplate, then in such a case the invitee is
within the limits of his invitation despite the owner's
contention that the invitation did not extend to the
particular area where the injury occurred. In the case
now before the Court the knowledge of the operator
and n1anager of the Defendant's pre1nises of the frequency with which the doors concerned had been nlistaken for doors leading to restroon1s, roupled \Yith the
20
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failure of the D'efendant to "\varn of the nature of the
area to which the doors led, strongly support Plaintiff's
eontention that he \vas still within the area of his invitation when he sustained his injuries. Harper and
Jan1es in their work on The Lau' of Torts, Vol. 2, at page
1486, discuss the law question no\v before the court and
state as follows:
"If, on the other hand, a defendant arranges
part of his prernises, leading a visitor reasonably
to think they are included in the area of invitation, he will be held as an invitor as to that part
even though he did not mean to invite plaintiff
to it."
The question of a Plaintiff's rnaking an erroneous
choice of doors, and receiving injuries resulting frorn
such error was discussed by the Massachusetts Suprerne
Judicial Court in the case of Palmer vs. Boston Penny
Savings Bank, ~lass. 17 NE 2d 899. In this case the
facts \vere as follows: Plaintiff parked his car at a
public garage intending to call for it later that night;
he received a clairn check fron1 the atendant and l'eft
by the san1e door he had entered. Plaintiff had never
been to the garage before. This garage had three entrances, a large center door for n1otor vehicles, and on
each side of the center door and a few feet away an
ordinary sized door. The \Vesterly of these ordinary
sized doors led directly into the garage; the easterly
door led to a stairway which "\Vent down to a boiler roorn.
Plaintiff returned to the garage late at night, found
the large center door locked, and he erroneously assunled that the easterlY door was the door he had used
previously; he opened the doo1·, and fell do\\Tn a dark
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stair"\\ray. The Court held at page 902:
"The main question is whether or not Plaintiff could have been found to have been an invitee in using the easterly door as an entranc·e
to the place where his automobile 'vas stored.
It is cl'ear there was no express invitation for
him to do so. But the jury could consider the
location of the three doors and the apparent purpose for which they were intended. They could
find that the center door "\\7as locked at a tin1e
when the Defendant's premises were not closed
to business, and that it was reasonable to expect,
in the abs·ence of any sn1aller door in the center
door which would permit a person to enter the
garage, that another means of ingress was available for the use of persons who came to get their
automobiles. * * * We cannot say under that
such circumstances, with others appearing in
the evidence, when considered in conjunction with
each other, were not sufficient fairly to constitute a representation that the Easterly door w·as
intended as an entrance to the garage.
The
plaintiff was entitled to rely to a reasonable extent upon appearances even though he misjudged
the actual situation. The fact that this door
was left unlocked did not of itself constitute an
invitation to enter, but the Plaintiff 'vas entitled to have this fact viewed in the light of all
the attending circumstances. If the jury could
find, as we think they could, that the Plaintiff
was an invitee at the time he was injured, then
it is clear that the deteru1ination of Defendant'~
negligence was properly left to the jury.'~
In the Texas case of J.ll o ntg onz ery vs. Allis-Chalmwrs
Mfg. Co., 164 S. W. 2d 356, the plaintiff and her husband
entered the defendant's place of business to discuss the
22
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purchas'e of far1n implernents. While plaintiff's husband was conducting his business with defendant, plaintiff desired to use the ladies rest room. There was no
one present in the display room from. whom she could
inquire as to the location of the rest room. Plaintiff
rnistakenly entered an unlocked, unrnarked door which
led to the basement, believing this door to be the entrance to the ladies rest room she was seeking. She
fell dovvn the stairs to the basement and was injured.
The trial court granted judgment for defendant; plaintiff appealed and was granted a new trial. In discussing the questions of negligence on the· part· of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff the Court stated at 557, 558:
"However, under the liberal indulgence of
inferences, in1plications and intendrnents in such
cases, we are of opinion that, \Vhether or not, in
the exercis'e of reasonale care, the defendant
corporation should have anticipated that a person situated as was plaintiff's vvife, n1inus the
named precautionary measures, would likely
mistake and enter th'e unlocked and unnamed door
under the belief that it opened in to the ladies'
r·estroom, was a question of fact and not one of
law; nor do we think it can correctly be said, a~
a matter of law, that she was guilty of contributory negligence.
"The doctrine we think applicable. to the
situation presented, is announced in , 38 A'JJte r.
Jur. (subject Negligence), p 796, 135, a.s follo,v:-;:
'It is vvell settled that where a store, office "Quilding, or similar business establishrneht ·
·\vhi(~h
the public is irnpliedly invited has a doo1· lead:i'ng
to a cellar, elevator shaft, or other dangerot1s

to
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place, which is left unfastened, and which, fron1
its location and appearance, may be mistaken
for a door which a member of the public on the
premises is entitled to use, the proprietor j~
liable to a person who by mistake passes through
that door and is injured.' "
Under the fact situation presented to the court
in the instant case, any question as to whether the plaintiff was an invitee or a. licensee at the time of sustaining his injuries was a proper question of fact for the
jury to determine, and the Trial Court was in error in
granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFE,NDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT THE FACTS BEFORE THE
COURT PRESENTED TRIABLE ISSUES.
Summary Judgment is a drastic remedy and one
that should not be granted except upon a clear showing that there were no issues as to any material facts.
Plaintiff earnestly contends that where the defendant
failed to warn its patron of the danger of its open stairway, where the 'evidence was clear that Defendant had
knowledge of the propensity of patrons to seek a restroom in the area back of the dining roorn that negligence on the part of the defendant beca1ne an issue that
was entitled to be sub1nitted to the jury. Likewise the
plaintiff was entitled to have the question of the r'easonableness of his action in seeking a rest roo1n in the rear
of the prernises subrnitted to the jury.
It is well settled that to authorize the granting of
~J
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a Su1n1nary Judg1nent, the con1plete absence of any
genuine issue of facts must be apparent, and all doubts
thereon 1nust be resolved against the party moving for
a Sununary Judgment.
The following language frorn Peckham vs. Ronrico
Corporation, 7 F.R.D. 328 was cited with approval by
the New Mexico Suprerne Court in McLain vs; Haley,
207 P 2d 1013 at page 1014:
H(1) That Rule 56 should be cautiously invoked
to the end that the parties may always be afforded a trial where there is a bona fide dispute
of facts between them.

"(2) That a litigant has a right to a trial where
there is the slightest doubt as to the facts."
The Court at the hearing on a 1vlotion for Sumrnar~v Judgment should not attempt to try th'e issues
between the parties but should merely ascertain whether
in fact there is an issue.
In the case of Petersen vs. Alkema et ux, 261 P 2P.
175, the Utah Supre1ne Court said at Page 177:
"While in a given case a toolrnay be so sirnple
and the employee so familiar with it that the
Court would be corr'ect in holding as a 1natter
of law that he cannot recover, the case at bar i~
not such a case, but one which the couYt sho,ulrl
have heard all the evidence before deterrnining
wheth'er there was a breach of dltty by the plain.:.
tiff so as to nullify a possible breach of duty :by
the Defendant." ( En1phasis ours).
Based on the foregoing grounds the Suprerne (jourt
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vacated the action of the trial court in granting summary Judgment to the Defendant and remanded the
cause for trial.
It is submitted that depositions and affidavits are
a dangerous and unsatisfactory substitute for oral testimony before a ccurt and jury. The right of examination and cross examination in the presence of the triers
of the fact has often been acclain1ed as one of the 1nost
valuable attributes of the con1mon lavv system.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that the Summary Judgment in favor of the
defendant should be reversed, and the case r'emanded
to the trial court for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Pete N. Vlahos and
David S. Kunz,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant

26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

